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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 1988, the U.S. Congress passed the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "Trade Act" or
"Act").' This legislation was designed to address a wide range of
problems pertaining to U.S. economic status in the world. At the
core of the Trade Act was Congress' desire to remedy the growing
trade deficit.
This article will focus on four sections of the Trade Act:2 1)
exchange rates and economic policy, 2) international debt manage-
1. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 3001-3604,
102 Stat. 1372 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinaf-
ter Trade Act].
2. While each of the following sections are worthy of its own in-depth review, this arti-
cle will limit itself to a broad overview of these sections.
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ment, 3) subsidies and support of U.S. exports, and 4) foreign cor-
rupt practices. This article analyzes the nature of the problem, the
implementation strategy under the Act, prior law on the subject,
the net change in the law, and the likely effect of the new rules.
Wherever pertinent, alternative solutions that were not included in
the Act will be discussed.
II. EXCHANGE RATES AND ECONOMIC POLICY
Title III, Subtitle A of the Trade Act is entitled "Exchange
Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act of
1988." In this portion of the Trade Act, Congress noted that the
dramatic increase in the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s was due to
the rise in the relative value of the dollar.4 Furthermore, Congress
found that the shift in exchange rates was partially due to eco-
nomic policy changes and to monetary policy manipulations on the
part of some foreign nations. 5 The resulting artificial currency val-
ues produced an imbalance in trade and capital flows, and gave
industries in the country which manipulated its currency a sub-
stantial competitive advantage over U.S. industries.'
In order to sustain a stable and consistent exchange rate and
to achieve a balanced U.S. current account, Congress mandated
"intervention by the United States in foreign exchange markets as
part of a coordinated international strategic intervention effort."'
The Trade Act recognizes that the key to an orderly adjustment of
foreign exchange rates is coordination of macroeconomic policy.8
To this end, the Congress increased the accountability of the Presi-
dent of the United States for the effects of exchange rates and eco-
nomic policy on the trade deficit.' Furthermore, the Trade Act
adopted the goals of the Plaza Agreement of September 1985.0
3. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5354 (1988).
4. See id. § 5302(3).
5. See id. § 5302(3)(b).
6. See id.
7. See id. § 5302(9). This intervention was seen as an appropriate response to volatile
exchange markets.
8. See id. § 5302(1).
9. See id. § 5303(4).
10. See id. § 5303(1). The Plaza Agreement is a joint statement issued by the Group of
5 (France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States),
which acknowledges the danger posed by the deficit current account of the United States
and the surplus current accounts of Japan and West Germany. France-Republic of Ger-
many-Japan-United Kingdom-United States: Communique on World Economy and Foreign
Exchange Rates, Sept. 22, 1985, reprinted in 14 IMF SuRVEY 296 (1985); 24 LL.M. 1731-32
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The Trade Act directs the President of the United States to
negotiate with other nations to achieve both an integrated ap-
proach in macroeconomic policy, and exchange rates and trade
levels that are compatible with balanced current accounts." These
multilateral negotiations will almost certainly involve intervention
in currency markets.
Bilateral monetary negotiations under the Trade Act are as-
signed to the Secretary of the Treasury (the "Secretary"). 2 It is
the Secretary's responsibility to examine the exchange rate policies
of other nations, in order to determine if any countries are
manipulating their own currency to gain unfair trade advantages or
to influence the balance of payments." If the Secretary determines
that a country is engaging in currency manipulation designed to
influence the balance of payments, and if that country has both a
material global current account surplus and a significant bilateral
trade surplus with the United States, the Secretary must immedi-
ately initiate negotiations for the purpose of adjusting exchange
rates to fair levels." These negotiations may be direct and bilateral
or through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)." If negotia-
tions are not undertaken because of possible serious detrimental
impact on national economic and security interests, that decision
must be reported to the chairman and the ranking minority mem-
ber of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs and of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs.'
The Trade Act requires the Secretary to make an annual re-
port, with semi-annual updates, to the appropriate committees of
the House and Senate.17 The report must address the past year's
developments in currency exchange rates and any intervention in
currency markets, and analyze the factors and economic policies
that determined the exchange rates." More important, the report
must contain the result of the multilateral and bilateral negotia-
tions undertaken and recommendations for any changes necessary
(1985).
11. See 22 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(1)(A),(B) (1988).
12. See id. § 5304(b).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. § 5305(a).
18. See id. § 5305(b)(1),(2).
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to reach a balance in the current account of the United States."9
The report, and presumably the recommendations, are to be made
after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of the Federal
Reserve System.20 The purpose of such a report is to place the re-
sponsibility on Congress to act to correct the effects of imbalanced
exchange rates, in the event that multilateral and bilateral policy
negotiations break down.
The exchange rate and economic policy provisions under the
Trade Act parallel the objectives of the International Monetary
Fund.21 The enforcement means available under the Trade Act,
however, are not limited to the enforcement measures the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund may adopt.22 As a last resort against unco-
operative nations, Congress may enact protective legislation such
as quotas and import tariffs. Theoretically, any action taken could
also involve cutbacks in military assistance or in other non-eco-
nomic sanctions. As drastic as this may seem, the United States is
fighting for its own economic survival. If the threat from another
nation's economic policy is deemed serious enough, Congress may
enact increasingly restrictive responses until the imbalance is
corrected.
On the practical side, the inertia that is inherent in an institu-
tion like Congress inhibits immediate or decisive action. The com-
mittee process and lobbying of special interest groups serve to slow
the reaction time of the House and Senate to the point where sev-
eral years may have elapsed before action is taken. Also, the Group
of Five Agreement and the inherent support for an open market
global economy both work against protectionist legislation.22 In the
event that negotiations between the United States and a nation
with unfair exchange rates fail to produce an adjustment in that
nation's policies, any action that Congress may take is likely to be
too little and too late.
The U.S. trade deficit, to a significant extent, is related to ex-
change rate policies of numerous countries. Under the Trade Act,
however, the U.S. exchange rate policy, without additional Con-
19. See id. § 5305(b)(5),(6).
20. See id. § 5305(a).
21. See Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, Apr. 1, 1978, art. IV, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
22. For a history of the fund and the effects of conditionality, see Note, International
Monetary Fund Conditionality and Options for Aggrieved Fund Members, 20 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 665 (1987).
23. See 22 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (1988).
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gressional enactments, has no teeth. The President and the Secre-
tary of the Treasury are commanded to negotiate with U.S. trading
partners in order to eliminate the unfair competitive advantages
created by those "partners."'" Ironically, neither the President nor
the Secretary is empowered to take any action against recalcitrant
nations. Instead, the inability to reach an agreement is reported
back the House of Representatives and the Senate, together with
recommendations and information.25 Implicit in the Trade Act is
that, in order to implement the designs of Congress under the pre-
sent law, new legislation must be proposed, carried through com-
mittees, and approved by the House and the Senate. Legislation
that is to be enforced by subsequent legislation would appear to be
a somewhat inefficient way to carry out trade policy.
The effectiveness of the Trade Act's exchange rate adjustment
as a solution to trade imbalance has been disputed. A "White Pa-
per" report from Japan, cites the U.S. growth rate, coupled with
insufficient production capacity and short-sighted management, as
the primary causes of the U.S. trade deficit, not any disparity in
exchange rates." The report points to the post-Plaza Agreement
appreciation to support its proposition concerning the ineffective-
ness of exchange rate adjustment where underlying economic con-
ditions remain unchanged. The yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate, in
the year following the Plaza Agreement, rose from 200 yen per U.S.
dollar to 140 yen per U.S. dollar.2 7 At the same time, the United
States trade deficit rose from $124.4 billion to $147.7 billion.28 In a
speech on trade relations with Japan, U.S. Representative Glen S.
Fukushima noted that the exchange rate adjustments did not pro-
duce any corresponding increase in the price of Japanese automo-
biles sold in the United States. 9 In the same speech, Mr.
Fukushima said that non-price factors, such as perceptions of in-
ferior quality and loyalty to domestically produced goods, may ac-
count for the failure of U.S. exports to Japan to increase over the
24. Id.
25. Id. § 5305(b)(6).
26. 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 797 (June 17, 1987) [hereinafter Int'l Trade Rep.].
27. Id. at 798.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 802.
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same period.30 Thus, any increase in U.S. exports to Japan and a
corresponding slowdown in U.S purchases of Japanese products is
likely to happen independent of measured exchange rate adjust-
ments.
Finally, the Trade Act leaves unresolved the question of how
any negotiated exchange rate agreement would be carried out. In a
floating exchange rate market, the proposed adjustments depend
very heavily on currency market intervention by the central banks
of the various nations. The Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States has historically acted independently in formulating and car-
rying out economic policy. The Federal Reserve Board is appointed
to extremely long terms by the President, but does not report to
him.31 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Bank is a creature of legisla-
tive design, but does not depend on Congress for appropriation of
funds.3 2 Congress undoubtedly has the power to pass legislation
forcing the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee to act in a
particular manner to achieve desired economic results.3
The Trade Act correctly recognizes the economic impact of
large and continuing trade deficits. However, the exchange rate
and economic measures chosen to correct the situation may not be
enough to be effective. Additionally, it may prove to be difficult to
isolate the results of such measures, where so many other factors
come to bear on trade deficits.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT ACT
Title III, Subtitle B of the Act is referred to as the "Interna-
tional Debt Management Act of 1988" (IDMA). 4 Congress,
through this section, recognized the interdependency of capital
transfers between nations, service costs on external debt, imports
and exports and the economic growth of a debtor country."3 The
legislation calls for U.S. policy to broach these problems with the
primary goal of stabilizing U.S. banks and lending institutions
30. Id.
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 241 (1988) (President appoints the members of the Federal Reserve
Board to 14 year terms); but cf. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (providing for staggered terms so
that a vacancy occurs only once in every 2 years, in order to limit "stacking" by the
President).
32. Id. § 243.
33. See id. § 225a (1988) for establishment of economic goals by Congress.
34. Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3101 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 5321 (1988)).
35. 22 U.S.C. § 5322.
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which hold the debts of these debtor nations." The legislation rec-
ognizes that a country's debt payments absorb the majority of its
foreign currency reserves, which in turn limits its potential
purchases of U.S. goods and services. 7 Furthermore, to replenish
its foreign currency reserves, a debtor nation is forced to devote a
higher percentage of its productive capacity to goods for export,
depressing the world market price for such commodities.38 This
has the effect of reducing the market for comparable U.S. goods,
both in the United States and abroad.8
The IDMA attempts to deal with these problems in two ways.
First, it directs the Secretary of the Treasury to investigate the
feasibility of establishing the International Debt Management Au-
thority (the "Authority"), to coordinate the purchase of Third
World debt from banks and private creditors, and to work towards
an acceptable restructuring of Third World debt.40 Second, the
IDMA requires U.S. lending institutions to remove any impedi-
ments to renegotiation of loan terms and to minimize the risk to
the financial system that is posed by the threat of default."1
A. The International Debt Management Authority
The purpose of the Authority is to purchase sovereign debt of
less developed countries from private creditors at a discount, to
negotiate with debtor countries the restructuring of their debt, and
to assist creditor banks in liquidating their portfolios of loans to
these countries." The Secretary of the Treasury must determine
whether the creation of the Authority would have an adverse im-
pact on: a) the discount rate at which sovereign debt is currently
traded; b) the probability and severity of default of sovereign debt;
and c) the possibility of a slow down or other disruption in the
current debt service of these debtors."8 If the Secretary finds that
36. Id. § 5323(3). The now well-recognized debt crisis, especially in Latin America, has
a profound impact on the U.S. trade deficit. The Latin American countries, as long as they
are obliged to use up their foreign currency reserves in servicing their debt, cannot purchase
U.S. products or services in the quantities necessary to have an impact on the U.S. trade
deficit. Id.
37. See id. § 5322(5).
38. See id.
39. See id. § 5322(6).
40. See id. § 5331(a)(1),(3),(b).
41. See id. § 5331(a)(3).
42. See id.
43. See id. § 5331(a)(2).
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such concerns are a real possibility, then he shall report the rea-
sons for such a determination to Congress." If not, he is then re-
quired to initiate the negotiations with other nations necessary to
establish the Authority.45
The character of the Authority is determined by five specific
proposals which the Secretary must include as part of the negotia-
tions.' 6 These proposals provide that:
1) any loan restructuring assistance provided by such an au-
thority to any debtor nation should involve substantial commit-
ments by the debtor to: a) economic policies designed to improve
resource utilization and minimize capital flight, and b) preparation
of an economic management plan calculated to provide sustained
economic growth and to allow the debtor to meet its restructured
debt obligations; 7
2) support for such an authority should come from industrial-
ized countries and greater support should be expected from coun-
tries with strong current account surpluses;' 8
3) such an authority should have a clearly defined close work-
ing relationship with the IMF, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), and the vari-
ous regional development banks;' 9
4) such an authority should be designed to operate as a self-
supporting entity, requiring no routine appropriation of resources
from any member government, and to function subject to the
prohibitions contained in the first sentence of Section 3112(a); 0
and
5) such an authority should have a defined termination date
and a clear proposal for the restoration of credit worthiness to
debtor countries before that date.5
The Secretary of the Treasury is also directed to investigate
the assets available from the IMF and the IBRD to serve as collat-
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. § 5331(b).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. § 5332(a). The Trade Act explicitly states that subsequent action on the
part of Congress will be required before any funds, appropriations, guarantees or other fi-
nancial support will be made available for the creation or operation of the Authority.
51. Id.
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eral for loans to fund the activities of the IDMA.52 The Secretary
must report the results of the investigation, including a report on
the progress of negotiations with the other industrialized nations,
to Congress every six months beginning from the date of the
IDMA's enactment."
Under the IDMA, the IMF and the IBRD must report to Con-
gress within one year from the enactment date of the Trade Act."
These reports must review and analyze the debt burden of the de-
veloping countries, and explore possible alternative methods of
coping with the problem, including means such as discounting,
debt conversion (debt-equity swaps), rescheduling, and new lend-
ing instruments.55 The concept of the IDMA is also to be analyzed
in the reports.51
At the conclusion of the studies and discussions with other na-
tions, the Secretary of the Treasury must submit a report to Con-
gress containing a detailed description of all that has transpired
together with his recommendations for the legislation necessary to
establish the Authority.57 Congress has reserved itself the right to
take the last steps necessary to create the Authority. Most impor-
tant, the legislation would contain the appropriation of funds nec-
essary to capitalize the United States share in the venture."
Legal and economic experts consider the debt crisis as a threat
to the financial stability of the United States, and a worthy subject
of congressional attention. It remains to be seen, however, whether
the Authority will ever come into existence or have any substantial
impact on the problem. The total amounts at stake are almost too
immense for any single nation to deal with, even the United States.
At the end of 1987, the total external debt59 for Latin America (ex-
cluding Suriname and Jamaica) was over US$414.5 billion."0 This
52. Id. § 5332(a)(1),(2). The assets of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) are pri-
marily gold and uncommitted funds, respectively. The investigation is to be conducted
through the United States Executive Director for each of the institutions.
53. Id. § 5331(c).
54. Id. § 5333(a),(b).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. § 5331(d).
58. Id. § 5332(a).
59. The term "total external debt," includes long-term debt and short-term debt for
both the public and private sectors, as well as IMF repurchase obligations. INTER-AM. DEV.
BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 578 (1988).
60. Id at 580.
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figure includes Brazil's US$121.2 billion debt, Mexico's US$105
billion debt, and Argentina's US$51.6 billion.61 The total external
debt of Latin America had increased by almost US$90 billion since
the "crisis" was announced by Mexico's debt-service freeze of Mex-
ico in 1982. The bulk of the increase in Latin America was caused
by loans made for the purpose of meeting the scheduled payments
on existing debt. The monetary commitment by nations joining the
Authority to reduce the debt burden of Latin America needs to be
generous to have any appreciable effect.
A stated objective of the legislation is that support for the
IDMA should come from the industrialized countries and that such
support should be tied to the surplus in current accounts.6 In
1987, only three nations among the industrialized countries had a
surplus current account balance: Japan, West Germany, and the
Netherlands. Japan and West Germany had surpluses of US$86.96
billion and US$45.23 billion, respectively, while the Netherlands
had a modest surplus of US$3.38 billion. Obviously, these coun-
tries would be the first to be asked to finance the Authority.
It is difficult to conceive the reason why either Japan or West
Germany should make any significant sacrifices in this regard.
Neither country is dependent on Latin American countries as trad-
ing partners, nor are their banks threatened with insolvency if
there is a default in the foreign debt of those countries. The flood
of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depos-
its and slow demand led lending institutions in the United States
to look south for borrowers at that time, the U.S. lenders, spurred
by the Eurodollar market, were directly responsible for the dra-
matic increase in lending to less developed countries."
A contrasting view is that the United States, which had a cur-
rent account deficit of over $153.9 billion in 1987,5 and which can
fairly be said to be the largest market for Japanese and German
exports, must remain financially stable for Japan and Germany to
enjoy long-term economic health. In order to induce Japan and
61. Id.
62. 22 U.S.C. § 5331(b)(2) (1988). This objective should be a central part of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury's proposals to other industrialized nations.
63. See International Financial Statistics, 1988 Y.B. (Int'l Monetary Fund) 445, 371,
527.
64. For a comprehensive analysis of the factors giving rise to such lending practices, as
well as an excellent overview of the situation, see Comment, On Third World Debt, 25 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 83, 88-92 (1984).
65. See International Financial Statistics, supra note 63 at 721.
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West Germany to contribute significant capital financing to the
Authority, the U.S. representative at any negotiations will almost
certainly have to commit to equal or greater U.S. contributions.
Obviously, after the Latin American countries themselves, the
United States stands to benefit most from the resolution of the
Latin American debt crisis."
The effectiveness of the Authority's primary strategy, to
purchase sovereign debt at a discount from the stated value of the
obligation 6 7 will be determined by the amount raised for the Au-
thority through initial capitalization and loans secured by IMF and
World Bank pledges. The debt purchases should be directed at
short-term credit which requires a higher debt-service payment by
the debtor countries.66 Any restructuring or extension on this
short-term external debt would have a proportionately greater im-
pact on that nation's required debt-service payments. Obviously,
the greater the amount that the Authority has to work with, the
greater the impact on the debtor nations' foreign currency
outflows.
Another objective of the Authority is to assist creditor banks
in reducing their exposure in Third World debt.69 From the stand-
point of the banks, the problem with the Third World debt is not
merely the risk of default, but also the concentration of investment
in risky loans. In order to alleviate this heavy concentration, the
Authority should encourage a commercial market for those loans
that it cannot purchase for itself.
One possibility is to convert the loans into bonds, with the
same face value and interest rate, but in denominations of $1,000
or $10,000.70 Banks could then sell these bonds at a discount to
investors who are unwilling or unable to invest hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in foreign loans, but are willing to invest smaller
66. In 1985, U.S. banks' exposure for loans to less developed countries represented 8%
of total assets and 124% of capital. See Amaral, The Foreign Debt: From Liquidity Crisis to
Growth Crisis, 19 CASE WESTERN J. INT'L L. 17, 18 (1987).
67. 22 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(3)(A) (1988).
68. See INTER-AM. Dzv. BANK, supra note 59, at 581-82. Although short-term debt does
represent a much smaller percentage of total external debt, it generally requires much
higher payments of principal.
69. 22 U.S.C. § 5331(a)(3)(C) (1988).
70. A debtor nation is likely to resist issuing bonds which are non-registered and freely
traded, because it has an advantage if the indebtedness is held by large lending institutions.
The threat of non-payment on identifiable loans has been used to coerce banks into lending
more money to debtor countries. A widely dispersed and anozlymous class of bondholders
would eliminate this negotiating tool.
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amounts in traded bonds. Investors would still be taking a risk, but
the discounted purchase price would produce a much higher return
on investment.
71
The amount of the discount from face value, representing a
loss to banks, would be a function of the effective rate of return to
the investor who buys a bond. A key component of the effective
rate is the tax rate on the income from the bond. Bonds subject to
a much lower tax rate would not have to be discounted as much as
a regular bond in order to produce an equivalent return on invest-
ment. 2 A variation of this arrangement might allow the debtor na-
tion to share in the discounting process by exchanging bonds with
a face value less than the amount of the loan, but with additional
features to reduce the risk.
7 3
The alternative which has received the greatest amount of
publicity is the debt-equity swap.7" The advantages for the debtor
nation are a reduction in the debt service burden and increased
investment in its economy. The debt holder either sells the debt to
an investor who will exchange it for equity or keeps the equity in-
vestment for its own purposes. For example, American Pacific pur-
chased the El Mochito mine in Honduras and required working
capital for the mine's operation. Under an agreement with the
Honduran Government, American Pacific swapped debt with a
face value of US$4.5 million, at the official exchange rate, for nine
million lempiras.76 However, American Pacific had purchased the
71. For example, if a bond was issued for $100,000 with annual interest payments at
10%, and maturity in 10 years, what rate could be produced if a subsequent buyer pur-
chased the bond at a discount from its face value? If the investor desired an effective yield
of 20%, present value calculations dictate that the price should be $58,120. The banks, in
such a scenario, would have to recognize a loss of $41,880.
72. If an investor had desired, as in note 71 supra, a yield of 20%, then a tax rate of
30% would give him an effective yield of 14%, after-tax. However, if the same 10%, 10 year
bond was tax-free, then he would pay a different discount price to achieve the same yield of
14%. The discounted price would be $79,160, and the bank would only have to write off
$20,840. Of course, the United States would lose tax revenue as a result of this scheme.
73. An investor's desired return is a function of the perceived risk of the investment. If
a government were to pledge assets to support the bonds, such as the U.S. Treasury bonds
with zero coupon features that Mexico has proposed, the investor would accept a lower rate.
This would save the banks from a second discount that is too great for their reserves to
bear.
74. Sources on debt-equity swaps, along with many other aspects of the debt crisis, can
be found in Kudej & Essien, International Monetary Fund and Debt Crisis: A Selective
Bibliography, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751 (1985).
75. See How One MNC Negotiated a Debt Swap in Honduras as Part of Acquisition
Deal, Bus. LATIN AM., July 11, 1988, at 218.
76. Id.
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debt at a seventy percent discount and actually gained an addi-
tional US$3 million in lempiras.77
Individual debtor nations have structured their programs to fit
their own economic needs. Any country whose natural resources
have been exploited in the past is quick to ensure that the equity
investments held by foreign investors are not in essential indus-
tries or do not relinquish too much control over the country's econ-
omy. Also, a nation must concern itself with the inflationary effect
of issuing local currency to swap for the external debt. Argentina
has set quotas for the years 1988 through 1992 which limit the to-
tal amount of currency issued to almost $2 billion." Restrictions
on projects, as well as dividends and capital repatriation, are also
part of the Argentine program.7 Likewise, Mexico, initially an ag-
gressive participant in debt-equity swaps, still restricts access to
some industries through such investment."s
The Authority has a cloudy future. Its creation will no doubt
be the subject of heated negotiation, especially with Japan and
West Germany. If the initial hurdle is cleared, then Congress must
consider the reports and recommendations received and make a co-
herent allocation of funds for the Authority's initial capitalization.
Once established, the Authority has to buy the debts of less devel-
oped countries while negotiating favorable terms for prospective
investors. Similar to the "conditionality" of IMF's special drawing
rights,81 the Authority must condition a restructured loan to a
country on the country's changes in internal economic policy.82 Fi-
nally, the Authority is supposed to help the banks dispose of their
unwanted loans in an orderly fashion." Together, these may be im-
possible expectations, and the legislation which conceived it may
77. Id. at 219.
78. See Paz & Tecson, Argentina's Debt to Equity Conversion Program, 22 J. WORLD
TRADE 81, 82 (1988) for a discussion of the implementation of Resolution No. 992 (Oct. 15,
1987) of the Ministry of Economy.
79. Id. at 82-83. Foreign investors still must be approved, conversion funds cannot be
used to purchase land or make financial investments, and the dividends in foreign currency
may not be collected for four years. Repatriation of capital may not occur for 10 years.
80. See Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps in Mexico, 23 Tax. INT'L L. 443, 451 (1988).
Mexico also has suspended the program twice because of inflationary expectations. Id. at
452-56.
81. See INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, IMF CONDITIONALITY (J. Williamson
ed. 1983) for a collection of criticisms and comments on conditionality. The policies advo-
cated by the IMF are often highly resented by less developed countries.
82. 22 U.S.C. § 5331(b)(1) (1988).
83. Id.
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prove to be a well-intended waste.
B. Regulatory Provisions Affecting International Debt
Given the catastrophic consequences of a complete default by
Third World debtors, it is not surprising that Congress would look
for ways to cushion U.S. and world economic vulnerability to the
situation. Sections 3121(a) through (d) of the Trade Act, not incor-
porated into the United States Code, attempt to give the banks
some latitude in dealing with the debt crisis.8" Section 3121(e)
amends Title 12 of the United States Code by adding a provision
that requires federal agencies which regulate depository institu-
tions to make annual reports to Congress on the status of both
foreign lending practices and debt levels at specified U.S. banks.8 5
Section 3122 requires that the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation make recommendations on reg-
ulatory obstacles which inhibit debt conversions, write-downs or
restructurings." Finally, Section 3123 requires the Secretary of the
Treasury to investigate the possibilities of a one time allocation of
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the IMF to the poorest of the
heavily indebted countries, targeted to pay off sovereign debt.
8 7
Section 3121(a) states that regulations governing the interna-
tional assets of the U.S. banks should allow banks as much latitude
as possible when negotiating a reduction of principal and interest
on Third World debts.88 This requirement is mirrored by Section
84. See Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3121(a)-(d).
85. 12 U.S.C. § 3912 (1988). The initial report was to be made on March 31, 1989, and
on April 30 of each subsequent year. The report is to be directed to the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives.
The report, which individually targets the nine largest banks under federal agency juris-
diction and the next 13 banks in the aggregate would include the following (in order of asset
size): Citicorp, Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank America Corp., Chemical Bank (New York),
Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers Hanover, Security Pacific, Bankers Trust, First Interstate
Bankcorp., First Chicago, Wells Fargo, Bank of Boston, Continental Illinois, PNC Financial
Mellon Bank, Bank of New England, NCNB Corp., First Union Corp., Sun Trust Banks,
First Bank System, Shawmut National, Fleet/Norstar Financial, Irving Bank, Barnett Bank,
and NBD Bancorp. Harris, What Top Banks Make, BANKER'S MONTHLY, July, 1988, at 13-
16.
86. See Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3122.
87. Id. § 3123.
88. Id. § 3121(a). The targeted institutions are the "depository institutions" described
in § 19(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Reserve Act, clauses (i)-(vi). As defined at 12 U.S.C. §
461(b)(1)(A), the term includes insured bank, mutual savings bank, savings bank, insured
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3121(b), which directs regulatory agencies to be as flexible as possi-
ble in allowing financial institutions to determine the value of the
Third World loans and to account for the changes in such values."9
As may be expected, a bank might resist reducing the value of a
loan on its books if the effect is to reduce the value of the entire
foreign loan portfolio. However, banks would be more willing to
recognize the reduced value and to restructure the loans accord-
ingly, if the loss could be spread out over a period of time.
Section 3121(c) and (d) deals with Congress' intent that banks
with a substantial foreign loan exposure take steps to seek addi-
tional equity capital and to bring loan loss reserves up to a-more
responsible level.90 These sections place federal agencies in a
unique position to enforce their terms, because the sections di-
rectly and indirectly control a bank's ability to open new branches,
acquire other banks or expand the area of service into fields such
as insurance. Also, because a bank's legal lending limit is deter-
mined by the bank's capital,91 any rulings on what is "capital"
could limit a bank's ability to pursue the larger corporate loan bus-
iness. How much pressure the federal regulators will place on the
banks and whether the IDMA will be successful are open questions
for the future. Obviously, factors like the stock market crash in
October 1987 are outside of anyone's control, and the ability of the
banks to issue new stock is subject to many different influences.
Section 3121(e) amends the International Lending Supervision
Act of 19832 by adding a requirement that annual reports be made
to Congress on the levels of "value-impaired," "substandard" or
other types of troubled loans held by the largest banks."3 Also re-
quired, wherever feasible, is a compilation of new bank loans made
credit union member or other insured institution. See 12 U.S.C. § 461 (b)(1)(A) (1988).
89. See Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3121(b). Statement 15 of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) governs accounting by debtors and creditors for troubled debt
restructurings. Paragraph 35 generally requires that losses from restructuring be recognized
in the accounting period in which such restructuring occurred. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., ACCOUNTiNG STANDARDS 1988/89 ED. 176 (1988).
90. See Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3121(c),(d). In late May and early June of 1987,
other large banks followed the lead provided by Citicorp, and added large amounts to their
loan loss reserve. Citicorp added $3 billion to its reserve because of foreign debt, resulting in
the largest quarterly loss in U.S. history of $2.5 billion. Curiously, Citicorp stock price rose
following the announcement of the special allocation.
91. See Glidden, Capital-Based Limits on International Banking, 11 N.C.J. INT'L &
COMM. REG. 465 (1986) for a discussion on the regulation of bank lending limits under 12
U.S.C.
92. 12 U.S.C. § 3901 (1988).
93. Id. § 3912(d)(1).
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to heavily indebted less developed countries and any loans to a
sovereign power that were written off.9 4 The relationship between
banks and Third World nations, the progress made by both sides,
and the actions by other international regulatory agencies around
the globe are also to be reviewed by Congress.9 The goal of this
provision is to ensure that the problem area of international bank
lending and the greatest participant banks are not left out of the
bright light of congressional attention. Whether the report will
generate any action on the part of the legislative branch remains to
be seen.
The IDMA is a very generalized enactment requiring that
studies or negotiations be undertaken and a report with recom-
mendations be delivered to Congress. Mandatory action on the
identified problems is almost universally absent from the legisla-
tion. Subsequent enactments are required before any resolution of
the problems can be made. This feature makes the current legisla-
tion a mere statement, not a law which can be enforced.
IV. SUBSIDIES AND SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES EXPORTS
Title III, Subtitles C through G, are aimed at conditions or
practices which operate to exclude U.S. businesses from foreign
markets. The purposes of the legislation include multinational de-
velopment banks, nations whose export aid amounts to a subsidy,
export trading companies owned by banks, primary dealers in gov-
ernment debt instruments, and the status of treatment accorded to
U.S. financial institutions overseas. Title III adds to the United
States Code, as well as amending existing sections. The most im-
portant sections, Subtitles C, D, and F are discussed here. e
A. Multilateral Development Banks
Subtitle C, entitled "Multilateral Development Banks Pro-
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Subtitle E, the "Export Trading Company Act Amendments of 1988," amends the
Bank Holding Act of 1956 by further defining an export trading company, leverage, and
inventory. Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3401 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1988)). Subtitle G,
entitled "Financial Reports," requires that Congress be given quadrennial reports on foreign
countries' treatment of U.S. financial institutions which are attempting access to that na-
tion's banking and securities markets. Id. § 3601 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5351 (1988)).
[Vol. 21:2
OMNIBUS TRADE ACT
curement Act of 1988, ''e7 requires that the Executive Director rep-
resenting the United States take an active role in the procurement
process of such organizations. 8 This includes investigating any
complaints from a U.S. participant in the bidding process, and pro-
moting the opportunities for U.S. businessmen in procurement
contracts. Further, the Trade Act requires that the Department of
Treasury designate an "officer of procurement" to ensure that co-
operation and communication exists between the banks, the Trea-
sury, and the Department of Commerce. 9 As the largest partici-
pant in the designated organizations, the United States is in a
strong position to express its displeasure if it discovers that U.S.
businesses are the object of economic discrimination.
B. Export-Import Bank and Tied Aid Credit Amendments
Subtitle D, the Export-Import Bank and Tied Aid Credit
Amendments of 1988, addresses the practice of tied aid credits,
and the need for continued effort on the part of the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank or "Bank") in this regard. 00 The Eximbank was
previously authorized to make grants in order to supplement the
financing of U.S. exports.'' Even though an international agree-
ment exists to regulate unfair tied aid credit programs, Congress
felt that the Eximbank should continue its efforts to neutralize and
discourage these predatory practices.102 The Eximbank's authority,
which was to end in 1988, was extended to 1989.101 However, no
mention of any change in appropriation was made in the Trade
Act legislation."' The President of the Eximbank is required to
report to Congress on the tied credit program as well as on pro-
gress made by the Bank in this area and its recommendations for
the future."l 6
97. Id. § 3201 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 262a (1988)).
98. Id. Multilateral Development Banks are defined in the Multilateral Development
Banks Procurement Act of 1988, 22 U.S.C. § 262a (1988), as the IBRD, the International
Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation, the Asian Development Bank,
the African Development Bank, and the African Development Fund.
99. 22 U.S.C. § 262a(b) (1988).
100. Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3301 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1988)).
101. 12 U.S.C. § 635i-3(b)(1) (1988).
102. Id. § 635i-3(a).
103. Id. § 635i-3(b).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 635i-3(c).
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Section 3304 of the Trade Act amends part of the Export-Im-
port Bank Act of 1945 (the "1945 Act").106 The general rule in the
1945 Act is that the Bank may not extend credit of financial guar-
antees to the other countries if such assistance causes injury to
U.S. producers of the same, similar or competing commodity'0
The Trade Act amendments clarify the definition of "substantial
injury." If the Bank's assistance establishes or increases the foreign
country's capacity for production by an amount equal to one per-
cent of U.S. production, it will be deemed a substantial injury for
purposes of the 1945 Act.'08
The amendments further clarify the exception to the general
rule." 9 The exception permits the Eximbank to grant direct credit
or financial guarantees to foreign countries if the Bank determines
that the short- and long-term benefits to U.S. industry and em-
ployment outweigh the injury to U.S. producers and employment
of the same, similar or competing commodity."' The Trade Act
amendments specify that the Eximbank may examine both the
short-term and long-term injury to U.S. industry and employ-
ment.' 1 Thus, the Bank will probably grant assistance where the
short-term injury to the equivalent U.S. industry is outweighed by
the long-term benefits to all U.S. industries and employment.
C. The Primary Dealers Act
Subtitle F, the "Primary Dealers Act of 1988," is directed at
nations which prohibit U.S. financial firms from doing business
overseas." 2 The restrictions employed by the Japanese are singled
out.,
13
The Primary Dealers Act responds to unequal treatment by
limiting who may be designated as a primary dealer in government
debt instruments." 4 The Federal Reserve Board of Governors and
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York" 6 are prohibited from
106. Id. § 635(e).
107. Id. § 635(e)(1).
108. Id. § 635(e)(3).
109. Id. § 635(e)(2).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Trade Act, supra note 1, § 3501 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5352 (1988)).
113. Id. § 5342(a)(3),(4).
114. Id. § 5352(b).
115. As depository agents for the Treasury, the Federal Reserve system and the Federal
Reserve Banks are the conduits through which government obligations are sold. 15 U.S.C. §
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granting or continuing such designations 6 for any foreign per-
son'" whose country imposes competitive barriers to U.S. financial
companies." 8 However, there are exceptions to this rule. If the des-
ignation was given prior to July 31, 1987, and control of the com-
pany was acquired prior to July 31, 1987 by a foreign person, then
the prohibition against a continued designation does not apply.119
Another exception is granted where a person is a resident of a
country that, prior to July 31, 1987, entered into a bilateral agree-
ment with the United States for a free trade area. Similarly an
exception is granted if as of July 31, 1987120 that country was in
the process of negotiating a bilateral agreement with the United
States pursuant to Title 19 of the United States Code Section
2112(b)(4)(A). 12 ' Other than these exceptions, the mandate is a
step in the right direction: a clear statement of the United States
intent to level the playing field.
V. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND REVIEW OF ACQUISITIONS
For the ease and clarity of conditions under which U.S. busi-
nesses operate, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Amendments of 1988 (the "FCPAA").22 The FCPAA's purpose, in
part, was to eliminate uncertainty over certain possible violations
under the existing provisions, which could discourage businesses
from entering the export trade. 2s These regulations apply to issu-
ers of securities under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Securities Act").2 4
Section 13(b) of the Securities Act is expanded and softened
780-5(f) preserves the authority of the Federal Reserve System within this sphere of influ-
ence, while subjecting other dealers to SEC authority. 15 U.S.C. § 780-5(f) (1988).
116. Primary dealer means a "government securities dealer," within the meaning of 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(44) (1988), that is monitored by, reports to, and is recognized as a primary
dealer by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. See S. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
117. 22 U.S.C. § 5342(d) (1988) defines foreign person.
118. Id. § 5342(b)(1).
119. Id. § 5342(b)(2).
120. Id. § 5342(c).
121. 19 U.S.C. § 2112(b)(4)(A) (1982) (authorizing the President of the United States to
enter into agreements, including the elimination of a duty imposed by the United States,
with other nations for the purpose of harmonizing or eliminating barriers to international
trade).
122. Trade Act, supra note 1, § 5001 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988)).
123. Id. § 78b.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
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by the amendments. 125 No criminal penalty attaches to a failure to
comply with the internal control and record-keeping provisions
with Section 13(b) 2 6 unless a person acts "knowingly" in any cir-
cumvention, falsification or omission.' This amendment no doubt
relieved the fears of corporate officers, who may have believed that
criminal penalties could result from an honest error. The inclusion
of "knowingly" brings the law into alignment with traditional re-
quirements of mens rea 8 in criminal law.
The holders of less than fifty percent of the voting power of
another business concern, if they are issuers of securities under
Section 12 of the Securities Act,2 9 are obligated to use good faith
in an attempt to influence that concern to comply with the record
keeping requirements of Section 13(b).30
Section 5003 of the FCPAA makes a number of changes in the
existing law.' 3 Minor changes include a prohibition against induc-
ing a foreign official to "omit to do any act in violation of the law-
ful duty."' 2 More important, the Trade Act clarifies some actions
which are not covered by the general prohibitions. A payment
which expedites or secures a "routine governmental action" is not
in violation of the amended law.1" A common example might be
tipping a customs officer for the prompt processing of baggage or
goods.
The FCPAA creates two affirmative defenses for potential de-
fendants: 1) that the challenged action does not violate the written
laws and regulations of that other nation;8 4 or 2) that the action is
a reasonable expense incurred by a foreign official in connection
with the promotion of products and services, or the execution of
governmental contracts. 35 Again, this is a case of the law recogniz-
ing the realities of business.
The U.S. Attorney General is required to issue guidelines and
125. Id. § 79.
126. Id. § 78m(b)(4).
127. Id. § 78m(b)(5).
128. Mens rea is a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 889 (5th ed. 1979).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(8) (1988).
130. Id. § 78m(b)(2).
131. See id. § 78dd-1.
132. Id. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A).
133. Id. § 78dd-l(b).
134. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(1).
135. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(2).
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precautionary procedures that further serve the needs of the U.S.
business community with regard to the rules for doing business
across the borders. 86 Furthermore, the Attorney General is obli-
gated to respond to inquiries from the public concerning their con-
formance with the law.' 7 The Attorney General's response shall
not be made public, despite federal disclosure requirements, unless
the requesting party so authorizes."'
A. Authority to Review Mergers, Acquisitions, and Take-
overs
Section 5021 of the FCPAA, entitled "Authority To Review
Certain Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers," grants to the Presi-
dent the power, under the guise of the "Defense Production Act of
1950,"'-9 to suspend any merger or acquisition of industry the
President judges to be a threat to national security." 0 This author-
ity may be exercised, after an investigation, only if the President
has found credible evidence that a foreign interest exercising con-
trol may act adversely to U.S. national security,"" and if no other
provisions of law are an adequate source of Presidential author-
ity."42 These findings must be reported, in writing, to both the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives. 14 The national security in-
terest must be evaluated from three perspectives: 1) domestic
production needed for national defense; 2) capability and capacity
of domestic industry to meet these requirements; and 3) the con-
trol over domestic activities and commerce by foreign citizens."4
The President may direct the U.S. Attorney General to seek relief
in the federal district courts, including an order for divestment."4
However, divestment is an extreme measure, and not likely to be
used. Its value may lie in the fact that mere presidential scrutiny
may discourage certain takeovers of U.S. businesses by foreign cor-
136. Id. 9 78dd-l(d)(2).
137. Id. §78dd-1(e)(1).
138. Id. § 78dd-l(e)(2). Specifically exempted is the requirement that an agency make
available to the public its statements of policy and interpretations adopted by the agency, as
set out in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B).
139. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158 (1988).
140. Id. § 2170(a).
141. Id. § 2170(d)(1).
142. Id. § 2170(d)(2).
143. Id. § 2170(f).
144. Id. § 2170(e).
145. Id. § 2170(c).
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porations if a domestic concern can call enough attention to the
proposed takeover.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 cannot
be expected to be remembered among the great pieces of U.S. leg-
islation. It will likely prove to be ineffective because its provisions
concerning exchange rates and international debt are largely unen-
forceable. The congressional mandate contained in the Trade Act
is a directive to go forth and negotiate. If the negotiations are not
satisfactory, a report is to be made back to Congress, which will
then contemplate appropriate action on the problem. As previously
stated, any law that requires a subsequent law to enforce its provi-
sions is itself an unenforceable law. Unfortunately, this relegates
the Act to being a piece of largely ineffective legislation.
PATRICK T. LENNON
